For And Against Method. Including Lakato'S Lectures On Scientific Method And The Lakatos-Feyerabend Correspondence (Relié)

2 March 1973 Dear Paul, On studying your Against Method I am increasingly worried. To my mind you have a basic weakness in your position which is at least as bad as mine. To be fair to you I am telling you right now where the contradiction lies. If you were consistent, you would have the courage to be a sceptic. For the first time to my knowledge, you now say that epistemological anarchism cannot bc equated with scepticism. If so, I shall prove that epistemological anarchism is doublefaced. One face is the face of a sceptic, the other is the face of a Kuhnian authoritarian. I am terribly sorry about this, but you either return to complete scepticism or I shall show that you are inconsistent. All that I can promise is that I shall do it with a light touch so that you will be killed and most people will believe that you are being praised.... Yours ever, Imre March 1973 Berkeley Dear Imre, I have thought it over, and I do not think you have discovered an "inconsistency." What does the sceptic do? He says there are no reasons to believe in anything, all views are equally unproven hence he will not make any positive assertions and he will keep close to customary forms of life. To me this is not going far enough. If he does not know anything, then he may well do what he wants to do, that is, he may engage in propaganda, he may defend the status quo, he may oppose it-"anything goes." "Anything goes," on the other hand, clearly does not mean scepticism. It means: anything goes, therefore also law and order, argument, irrationalism etc. To amuse himself, and not really expecting any result, the epistemological anarchist may for short times or for long play the thinking games of the rationalist to throw him into confusion. For example, he may "show" him ("show" now interpreted in the way in which the rationalist interprets it) that anarchistic moves (moves the rationalist calls "anarchistic") have led to results the rationalist loves-and he may thereby throw him in confusion (being an anarchist he may not really expect this to happen but, lo and behold, it happens, most of the time). So, Imre, I don't think I am inconsistent, I rather think the classical sceptic is inconsistent, going on as he does as if he had some reasons for doing so, while as a matter of fact he can now do anything he likes, including defend the status quo. You see, the sceptic argues (for example), despite his sceptic stance. I can do this by pointing out that it may (or may not) throw people into confusion. At any rate, it is a marvellous way of sneaking into the minds of rationalists.... Love, Paul The work that helped establish Paul Feyerabend's fame and notoriety, Against Method, stemmed from Imre Lakatos's challenge: "In 1970 Imre cornered me at a party. 'Paul,' he said, 'you have such strange ideas. Why don't you write them down? I shall write a reply, we publish the whole thing and I promise you-we shall have a lot of fun."' Lakatos died before he could write his reply, but For and Against Method reconstructs his original counter-arguments from his lectures and presents the Lakatos-Feyerabend correspondence that allows us to share the "fun" two of this century's great philosophers enjoyed in matching their wits and ideas on science, philosophy, and life. For and Against Method opens with an imaginary dialogue between Lakatos and Feyerabend, written by Matteo Motterlini on the basis of their published works, to introduce and synthesize their positions and arguments. Part One presents the transcripts of Lakatos's last lectures on method. Part Two, Feyerabend's response, is his "Theses on Anarchism," which began the attack on Lakatos's position that Feyerabend later continued in Against Method. The third and longest section consists of the correspondence, previously unpublished in English, that Lakatos and Feyerabend exchanged on science, philosophy, and the events of their daily lives between 1968 and Lakatos's death in 1974. Appendixes present the views of Lakatos and Feyerabend on the aims and methods of university education, an unpublished paper by Lakatos entitled "The Intellectuals' Betrayal of Reason," a letter from Lakatos to the editors of the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science in late 1973 outlining his future research and administrative plans, and brief biographies of Lakatos and Feyerabend. The delight Lakatos and Feyerabend took in debate, and the relish with which they sparred, come to life again in For and Against Method, making it lively and essential reading for everyone interested in these two fascinating and controversial thinkers and in the philosophy and science that were their shared passions.